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#### **US economic engagement with Mexico is a vehicle for neoliberal exploitation for the entire region – the plan becomes a tool for military intervention and US security interests while strengthening its economic grip over Latin America**

Jacobs, 04 – Assistant Prof of Polisci at West Virginia University (Jamie Elizabeth, "Neoliberalism and Neopanamericanism: The View from Latin America," Latin American Politics & Society 46.4 (2004) 149-152, MUSE)//VP

The advance of neoliberalism suffers no shortage of critics, both from its supporters who seek a greater balance in the interests of North and South, and from its opponents who see it as lacking any real choice for developing states. The spread of neoliberalism is viewed by its strongest critics as part of the continuing expression of Western power through the mechanisms of globalization, often directly linked to the hegemonic power of the United States. Gary Prevost and Carlos Oliva Campos have assembled a collection of articles that pushes this debate in a somewhat new direction. This compilation addresses the question from a different perspective, focusing not on the neoliberal process as globalization but on neoliberalism as the new guise of panamericanism, which emphasizes a distinctly political overtone in the discussion. The edited volume argues that neoliberalism reanimates a system of relations in the hemisphere that reinforces the most negative aspects of the last century's U.S.-dominated panamericanism. The assembled authors offer a critical view that places neoliberalism squarely in the realm of U.S. hegemonic exploitation of interamerican relations. This volume, furthermore, articulates a detailed vision of the potential failures of this approach in terms of culture, politics, security, and economics for both North and South. Oliva and Prevost present a view from Latin America that differs from that of other works that emphasize globalization as a general or global process. This volume focuses on the implementation of free market capitalism in the Americas as a continuation of the U.S. history of hegemonic control of the hemisphere. While Oliva and Prevost and the other authors featured in this volume point to the changes that have altered global relations since the end of the Cold War—among them an altered balance of power, shifting U.S. strategy, and evolving interamerican relations—they all view the U.S. foreign policy of neoliberalism and economic integration essentially as old wine in new bottles. As such, old enemies (communism) are replaced by new (drugs and terrorism), but the fear of Northern domination of and intervention in Latin America remains. Specifically, Oliva and Prevost identify the process through which "economics had taken center stage in interamerican affairs." They [End Page 149] suggest that the Washington Consensus—diminishing the state's role in the economy, privatizing to reduce public deficits, and shifting more fully to external markets—was instead a recipe for weakened governments susceptible to hemispheric domination by the United States (xi). The book is divided into two main sections that emphasize hemispheric and regional issues, respectively. The first section links more effectively to the overall theme of the volume in its chapters on interamerican relations, culture, governance, trade, and security. In the first of these chapters, Oliva traces the evolution of U.S. influence in Latin America and concludes that, like the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny in the past, the prospect of hemispheric economic integration will be marked by a dominant view privileging U.S. security, conceptualized in transnational, hemispheric terms, that is both asymmetrical and not truly integrated among all members. In this context, Oliva identifies the free trade area of the Americas (FTAA) as "an economic project suited to a hemispheric context that is politically favorable to the United States" (20). The chapters in this section are strongest when they focus on the political aspects of neoliberalism and the possible unintended negative consequences that could arise from the neoliberal program. Carlos Alzugaray Treto draws on the history of political philosophy, traced to Polanyi, identifying ways that social inequality has the potential to undermine the stable governance that is so crucial a part of the neoliberal plan. He goes on to point out how this potential for instability could also generate a new period of U.S. interventionism in Latin America. Treto also analyzes how the "liberal peace" could be undermined by the "right of humanitarian intervention" in the Americas if the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia served as a model for U.S. involvement in the hemisphere. Hector Luis Saint-Pierre raises the issue of "democratic neoauthoritarianism," responsible for "restricting citizenship to the exercise of voting, limiting its voice to electoral polls of public opinion, restraining human rights to consumer's rights, [and] shutting down spaces to the citizens' participation" (116). While these critiques are leveled from a structuralist viewpoint, they often highlight concerns expressed from other theoretical perspectives and subfields (such as the literature on citizenship and participation in the context of economic integration). These chapters also emphasize the way inattention to economic, social, and political crisis could damage attempts at integration and the overall success of the neoliberal paradigm in the Americas. In general, the section on hemispheric issues offers a suspicious view of the U.S. role in promoting integration, arguing that in reality, integration offers a deepening of historical asymmetries of power, the potential to create new justifications for hegemonic intervention, and the further weakening of state sovereignty in the South. [End Page 150] If the first section of the book is joined with skepticism of integration as panamericanism and chooses to focus broadly on the negative effects of the implementation of these policies, part 2 links these regional issues with the politics of specific countries. This section offers articles that speak to country-specific issues in a regional context and to ways that bilateral relations with the United States shape the overall context of regional and hemispheric integration. The regional issues range from CARICOM's evolution to the different approaches to balancing human security and globalization in Central America, the special relationship of Mexico and the United States, and the disincentives for political parties to embrace the Mercosur process. Again, the authors offer continued pessimism about the process of integration unless Latin American states can exercise more control over its evolution. Key to this idea of alternative integration are Brazil and Mexico, the former more successful in asserting its independence than the latter, in the authors' view. Jaime Preciado Coronado singles out the geopolitics of U.S.-Mexican relations and their magnified effect in the region, where the United States has collaborated in Mexico's insertion into the world networks of interdependence and, in return, Mexico promotes the idea of the Washington Consensus intensely and its model of the promotion of free trade with the United States for the rest of Latin America, in order to achieve the consolidation of the continental bloc that maintains American hegemony through the use of the advantages of the international division of labor.

#### Neoliberalism causes extinction

Darder, 10 – Professor Antonia Darder, Distinguished Professor of Education, University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign (“Preface” in *Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, & Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement* by Richard V. Kahn, 2010, pp. x-xiii)//VP

GENDER MODIFIED

It is fitting to begin my words about Richard Kahn’s Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, and Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement with a poem. The direct and succinct message of The Great Mother Wails cuts through our theorizing and opens us up to the very heart of the book’s message—to ignite a fire that speaks to **the ecological crisis** at hand; a crisis orchestrated by the inhumane greed and economic brutality of the wealthy. Nevertheless, as is clearly apparent, none of us is absolved from complicity with the devastating destruction of the earth. As members of the global community, we are all implicated in this destruction by the very manner in which we define ourselves, each other, and all living beings with whom we reside on the earth. Everywhere we look there are glaring signs of political systems and social structures that propel us toward **unsustainability and extinction**. In this historical moment, the planet faces some of the most horrendous forms of “[hu]man-made” devastation ever known to humankind. Cataclysmic “natural disasters” in the last decade have sung the environmental hymns of planetary imbalance and reckless environmental disregard. A striking feature of this ecological crisis, both locally and globally, is the **overwhelming concentration of wealth** held by the ruling elite and their agents of capital. This environmental malaise is characterized by the staggering loss of livelihood among working people everywhere; gross inequalities in educational opportunities; an absence of health care for millions; an unprecedented number of people living behind bars; and trillions spent on fabricated wars fundamentally tied to the control and domination of the planet’s resources. The Western ethos of mastery and supremacy over nature has accompanied, to our detriment, the unrelenting expansion of capitalism and its unparalleled domination over all aspects of human life. This hegemonic worldview has been unmercifully imparted through a host of public policies and practices that conveniently gloss over gross inequalities as commonsensical necessities for democracy to bloom. As a consequence, the liberal democratic rhetoric of “we are all created equal” hardly begins to touch the international pervasiveness of racism, patriarchy, technocracy, and economic piracy by the West, all which have fostered the erosion of civil rights and the unprecedented ecological exploitation of societies, creating conditions that now threaten our peril, if we do not reverse directions. Cataclysmic disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, are unfortunate testimonies to the danger of ignoring the warnings of the natural world, especially when coupled with egregious governmental neglect of impoverished people. Equally disturbing, is the manner in which ecological crisis is vulgarly exploited by unscrupulous and ruthless capitalists who see no problem with turning a profit off the backs of ailing and mourning oppressed populations of every species—whether they be victims of weather disasters, catastrophic illnesses, industrial pollution, or inhumane practices of incarceration. Ultimately, these constitute ecological calamities that speak to the inhumanity and tyranny of material profiteering, at the expense of precious life. The arrogance and exploitation of neoliberal values of consumption dishonor the contemporary suffering of poor and marginalized populations around the globe. Neoliberalism denies or simply mocks (“Drill baby drill!”) the interrelationship and delicate balance that exists between all living beings, including the body earth. In its stead, values of individualism, competition, privatization, and the “free market” systematically debase the ancient ecological knowledge of indigenous populations, who have, implicitly or explicitly, rejected the fabricated ethos of “progress and democracy” propagated by the West. In its consuming frenzy to gobble up the natural resources of the planet for its own hyperbolic quest for material domination, the exploitative nature of capitalism and its burgeoning technocracy has dangerously deepened the structures of social exclusion, through the destruction of the very biodiversity that has been key to our global survival for millennia. Kahn insists that this devastation of all species and the planet must be fully recognized and soberly critiqued. But he does not stop there. Alongside, he rightly argues for political principles of engagement for the construction of a critical ecopedagogy and ecoliteracy that is founded on economic redistribution, cultural and linguistic democracy, indigenous sovereignty, universal human rights, and a fundamental respect for all life. As such, Kahn seeks to bring us all back to a formidable relationship with the earth, one that is unquestionably rooted in an integral order of knowledge, imbued with physical, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual wisdom. Within the context of such an ecologically grounded epistemology, Kahn uncompromisingly argues that our organic relationship with the earth is also intimately tied to our struggles for cultural self-determination, environmental sustainability, social and material justice, and global peace. Through a carefully framed analysis of past disasters and current ecological crisis, Kahn issues an urgent call for a critical ecopedagogy that makes central explicit articulations of the ways in which societies construct ideological, political, and cultural systems, based on social structures and practices that can serve to promote ecological sustainability and biodiversity or, conversely, lead us down a disastrous path of unsustainability and extinction. In making his case, Kahn provides a grounded examination of the manner in which consuming capitalism manifests its repressive force throughout the globe, disrupting the very ecological order of knowledge essential to the planet’s sustainability. He offers an understanding of critical ecopedagogy and ecoliteracy that inherently critiques the history of Western civilization and the anthropomorphic assumptions that sustain patriarchy and the subjugation of all subordinated living beings—assumptions that continue to inform traditional education discourses around the world. Kahn incisively demonstrates how a theory of multiple technoliteracies can be used to effectively critique the ecological corruption and destruction behind mainstream uses of technology and the media in the interest of the neoliberal marketplace. As such, his work points to the manner in which the sustainability rhetoric of mainstream environmentalism actually **camouflages** wretched neoliberal policies and practices that left unchecked **hasten the annihilation of the globe’s ecosystem**. True to its promise, the book cautions that any anti-hegemonic resistance movement that claims social justice, universal human rights, or global peace must contend forthrightly with the deteriorating ecological crisis at hand, as well as consider possible strategies and relationships that rupture the status quo and transform environmental conditions that threaten disaster. A failure to integrate ecological sustainability at the core of our political and pedagogical struggles for liberation, Kahn argues, is to blindly and misguidedly adhere to an anthropocentric worldview in which emancipatory dreams are deemed solely about human interests, without attention either to the health of the planet or to the well-being of all species with whom we walk the earth.

#### The alternative is to reject the 1ac to interrogate neoliberal economic engagement with latin America from the starting point of knowledge production- that is a prerequisite to breaking down neoliberalism

**Walsh, 12** – Estudios Culturales Latinoamericanos de la Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar (Catherine, “The Politics of Naming”, Cultural Studies, 26.1, Project Muse)//VP

Cultural Studies, in our project, is constructed and understood as more than a field of ‘study’. It is broadly understand as a formation, a field of possibility and expression. And it is constructed as a space of encounter between disciplines and intellectual, political and ethical projects that seek to combat what Alberto Moreiras called the impoverishment of thought driven by divisions (disciplinary, epistemological, geographic, etc.) and the socio-political-cultural fragmentation that increasingly makes social change and intervention appear to be divided forces (Moreiras 2001). As such, Cultural Studies is conceived as a place of plural-, inter-, transand in-disciplinary (or undisciplined) critical thinking that takes as major concern the intimate relationships between culture, knowledge, politics and economics mentioned earlier, and that sees the problems of the region as both local and global. It is a space from which to search for ways of thinking, knowing, comprehending, feeling and acting that permit us to intervene and influence: a field that makes possible convergence and articulation, particularly between efforts, practices, knowledge and projects that focus on more global justice, on differences (epistemic, ontological, existential, of gender, ethnicity, class, race, nation, among others) constructed as inequalities within the framework of neo-liberal capitalism. It is a place that seeks answers, encourages intervention and engenders projects and proposals. It is in this frame of understanding and practice in our Ph.D. programme in Latin-American Cultural Studies at the Universidad Andina Simo´n Bolı´var, that this broad description-definition continues to take on more concrete characteristics. Here I can identify three that stand out: the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial. The inter-cultural has been and still is a central axis in the struggles and processes of social change in the Andean region. Its critical meaning was first affirmed near the end of the 1980s in the Ecuadorian indigenous movement’s political project. Here inter-culturality was positioned as an ideological principal grounded in the urgent need for a radical transformation of social structures, institutions and relationships, not only for indigenous peoples but also for society as a whole. Since then, inter-culturality has marked a social, political, ethical project and process that is also epistemological;6 a project and a process that seek to re-found the bases of the nation and national culture, understood as homogenous and mono-cultural. Such call for re-founding does not to simply add diversity to what is already established, but rather to rethink, rebuild and inter-culturalize the nation and national culture, and with in the terrains of knowledge, politics and life-based visions. It is this understanding of the inter-cultural that is of interest. Concretely, we are interested in the spaces of agency, creation, innovation and encounter between and among different subjects, knowledges, practices and visions. Referring to our project of Cultural Studies as (inter)Cultural Studies, enables and encourages us to think from this region, from the struggles, practices and processes that question Eurocentric, colonial and imperial legacies, and work to transform and create radically different conditions for thinking, encountering, being and coexisting or co-living. In a similar fashion, the inter-epistemic focuses on the need to question, interrupt and transgress the Euro-USA-centric epistemological frameworks that dominate Latin-American universities and even some Cultural Studies programmes. To think with knowledges produced in Latin America and the Caribbean (as well as in other ‘Souths’, including those located in the North) and by intellectuals who come not only from academia, but also from other projects, communities and social movements are, for us, a necessary and essential step, both in de-colonization and in creating other conditions of knowledge and understanding. Our project, thus, concerns itself with the work of inverting the geopolitics of knowledge, with placing attention on the historically subjugated and negated plurality of knowledge, logics and rationalities, and with the political-intellectual effort to create relationships, articulations and convergences between them. The de-colonial element is intimately related to the two preceding points. Here our interest is, on one hand, to make evident the thoughts, practices and experiences that both in the past and in the present have endeavoured to challenge the colonial matrix of power and domination, and to exist in spite of it, in its exterior and interior. By colonial matrix, we refer to the hierarchical system of racial civilizational classification that has operated and operates at different levels of life, including social identities (the superiority of white, heterosexual males), ontological-existential contexts (the dehumanization of indigenous and black peoples), epistemic contexts (the positioning of Euro-centrism as the only perspective of knowledge, thereby disregarding other epistemic rationalities), and cosmological (the control and/or negation of the ancestral-spiritual-territorial-existential bases that govern the life-systems of ancestral peoples, most especially those of African Diaspora and of Abya Yala) (see Quijano 1999). At the centre or the heart of this matrix is capitalism as the only possible model of civilization; the imposed social classification, the idea of ‘humanity’, the perspective of knowledge and the prototype life-system that goes with it defines itself through this capitalistic civilizational lens. As Quijano argues, by defending the interests of social domination and the exploitation of work under the hegemony of capital, ‘the ‘‘racialization’’ and the ‘‘capitalization’’ of social relationships of these models of power, and the ‘‘eurocentralization’’ of its control, are in the very roots of our present problems of identity,’ in Latin America as countries, ‘nations’ and States (Quijano 2006). It is precisely because of this that we consider the de-colonial to be a fundamental perspective. Within our project, the de-colonial does not seek to establish a new paradigm or line of thought but a critically-conscious understanding of the past and present that opens up and suggests questions, perspectives and paths to explore. As such, and on the other hand, we are interested in stimulating methodologies and pedagogies that, in the words of Jacqui Alexander (2005), cross the fictitious boundaries of exclusion and marginalization to contribute to the configuration of new ways of being and knowing rooted not in alterity itself, but in the principles of relation, complement and commitment. It is also to encourage other ways of reading, investigating and researching, of seeing, knowing, feeling, hearing and being, that challenge the singular reasoning of western modernity, make tense our own disciplinary frameworks of ‘study’ and interpretation, and persuade a questioning from and with radically distinct rationalities, knowledge, practices and civilizational-life-systems. It is through these three pillars of the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial that we attempt to understand the processes, experiences and struggles that are occurring in Latin America and elsewhere. But it is also here that we endeavour to contribute to and learn from the complex relationships between culture-politics-economics, knowledge and power in the world today; to unlearn to relearn from and with perspectives otherwise. Practices, experiences and challenges In this last section, my interest is to share some of the particularities of our doctorate programme/project, now in its third cycle; its achievements and advancements; and the challenges that it faces in an academic context, increasingly characterized regionally and internationally, by disciplinarity, depolitization, de-subjectivation, apathy, competitive individualism and nonintervention. Without a doubt, one of the unique characteristics of the programme/ project is its students: all mid-career professionals mainly from the Andean region and from such diverse fields as the social sciences, humanities, the arts, philosophy, communication, education and law. The connection that the majority of the students have with social and cultural movements and/or processes, along with their dedication to teaching or similar work, helps to contribute to dynamic debate and discussion not always seen in academia and post-graduate programmes. Similarly, the faculty of the programme stand out for being internationally renowned intellectuals, and, the majority, for their commitment to struggles of social transformation, critical thinking and the project of the doctorate itself. The curriculum offering is based on courses and seminars that seek to foment thinking from Latin American and with its intellectuals in all of their diversity comprehend, confront and affect the problems and realities of the region, which are not only local but global. The pedagogical methodological perspective aforementioned works to stimulate processes of collective thought and allow the participants to think from related formations, experiences and research topics and to think with the differences disciplinary, geographical, epistemic and subjective thereby fracturing individualism by dialoguing, transgressing and inter-crossing boundaries. Trans-disciplinarity, as such, is a fundamental position and process in our project. The fact that the graduate students come from an array of different backgrounds provides a plurality in which the methodologicalpedagogical practice becomes the challenge of collectively thinking, crossing disciplinary backgrounds and creating new positions and perspectives, conceived and formed in a trans-disciplinary way. The majority of courses, seminars and professors, also assume that this is a necessary challenge in today’s world when no single discipline and no single intellectual is capable alone of analyzing, comprehending or transforming social reality. Nevertheless, trans-disciplinary gains continue to be a point of criticism and contention, especially given the present trend to re-discipline the LatinAmerican university. As Edgardo Lander has argued (2000a), this tendency reflects the neo-liberalization of higher education, as well as the increasing conservatism of intellectuals, including those that previously identified as or to continue to identify themselves as progressives and/or leftists. To establish oneself in a discipline or presume truth through a discipline, a common practice today, is to reinstall the geopolitics of knowing. This, in turn, strengthens Euro-USA-centrism as ‘the place’ of theory and knowledge. As such, the subject of dispute is not simply the trans-disciplinary aspect of Cultural Studies but also its ‘indisciplinary’ nature, that is, the effort central to our project to include points of view that come from Latin America and thinkers who are not always connected to academia (see Walsh et al. 2002). Our interest is not, as some claim, to facilitate the agendas or cultural agency of subaltern groups or social movements, promote activism or simply include other knowledge forms, but instead to build a different political-intellectual project a political-intellectual project otherwise. Such project gives centrality to the need to learn to think from, together and with Latin American reality and its actors, thereby stimulating convergences, articulations and inter-culturalizations that aim at creating an academia that is committed to life itself. Such a perspective does not eliminate or deny knowledge conceived in Europe or North America usually named as ‘universal’ or its proponents and thinkers. Instead, it incorporates such knowledge as part of a broader canon and worldview that seeks pluriversality, recognizing the importance of places and loci of enunciation. For our project, all of this serves to highlight the doubly complicated situation that is still in flux. On one hand, there is the negative association with trans-disciplinarity and the academic suppositions that accompany it, particularly in the area of research; this requires that our theses be doubly rigorous. And, on the other hand, there is the geopolitical limitation not only of disciplines but also of academic disciplining. To argue, as we do, that knowledge and thought are also produced outside of universities and, in dialogue with Hall, that political movements also produce and provoke theoretic moments and movements, is to question and challenge the academic logic and the authority of a universal and singular reasoning and science. We will, through such questioning and challenges, always be marginalized, placed on the fringe, under a microscope, criticized and disputed. Because of this, the challenges that we have encountered have been many. On one hand, there are those challenges that many face in the Latin-American academic context: the real difficulties of financing, infrastructure and research support. On the other hand, are the challenges that come with the traditional academic disciplinary structure, its de-politization and de-subjectification. Here the challenge is to transgress the established norms of neutrality, distance and objectivity. It is also to confront the standards that give little relevance to historically subjugated groups, practices and knowledges, and to the interlinking of race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality with the structures and models of power and knowledge. It is to make evident past and present struggles that give real meaning to the arguments of heterogeneity, decoloniality and inter-culturality. Here the criticism and dispute comes from many sides: from those who describe these efforts as too politicized (and, as such, supposedly less ‘academic’), uni-paradigmatic (supposedly limited to only one ‘line of thought’), fundamentalist (supposedly exclusionary of those subjects not marked by the colonial wound) and as obsessed with conflict (and therefore far from the tradition of ‘culture’, its letters and object of study). These challenges together with the tensions, criticisms and disputes that they mark often times make the path more difficult. Still, and at the same time, they allow us to clarify the distinctive and unique aspects of our project and its motivations to continue with its course of construction, insurgence and struggle. Our concern here is not so much with the institutionalizing of Cultural Studies. Better yet, and in a much broader fashion, we are concerned with epistemic inter-culturalization, with the de-colonialization and pluriversalization of the ‘university’, and with a thinking from the South(s). To place these concerns, as argued here, within a perspective and a politics of naming: ‘(inter)Cultural Studies in de-colonial code,’ is to open, not close, paths. Conclusion In concluding the reflections I have presented here, it is useful to return to a fundamental point touched by Stuart Hall: ‘intervention’. In particular and with Hall, I refer to the will to intervene in and transform the world, an intervention that does not simply relate to social and political contexts and fields, but also to epistemology and theory. That is to an intervention and transformation in and a de-colonization of the frameworks and logics of our thinking, knowing and comprehending. To commit oneself in mind, body and spirit as Frantz Fanon argued. To consider Cultural Studies today a project of political vocation and intervention is to position and at the same time build our work on the borders of and the boundaries between university and society. It is to seriously reflect on whom we read and with whom we want and/or need to dialogue and think, to understand the very limits or our knowledge. And precisely because of this, it is to act on our own situation, establishing contacts and exchanges of different kinds in a pedagogicalmethodological zeal to think from and think with, in what I have elsewhere called a critical inter-culturality and de-colonial pedagogy (Walsh 2009). In universities and societies that are increasingly characterized by nonintervention, auto-complacency, individualism and apathy, intervention represents, suggests and promotes a position and practice of involvement, action and complicity. To take on such a position and practice and to make it an integral part of our political-intellectual project is to find not only ethical meaning in work on culture and power, but also to give this work some heart. That is to say, to focus on the ever-greater need and urgency of life. To call these Cultural Studies or critical (inter)Cultural Studies is only one of our options, and part of the politics of naming.

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#### The United States congress should condition expanding the mandate of the North American Development Bank to include funding for infrastructure improvement projects along the U.S.-Mexico border on ending human rights abuses by Mexican forces. The United States federal government should enact a periodic certification process to determine that abuses are effectively investigated and prosecuted.

#### Doing the plan without human rights conditions sends the message that the US condones torture and violence – turns the aff and reinforces organized crime

**WOLA 10** – Washington Office on Latin America (“Congress: Withhold Funds for Mexico Tied to Human Rights Performance,” 9/14/2010, <http://www.wola.org/publications/congress_withhold_funds_for_mexico_tied_to_human_rights_performance>)//VP

However, research conducted by our respective organizations, Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission, and even the State Department’s own reports, demonstrates conclusively that Mexico has failed to meet the four human rights requirements set out by law. As a result, Congress should not release these select Merida funds. Releasing these funds would send the message that the United States condones the grave human rights violations committed in Mexico, including torture, rape, killings, and enforced disappearances.¶ We recognize that Mexico is facing a severe public security crisis, and that the United States can play a constructive role in strengthening Mexico’s ability to confront organized crime in an effective manner. However, human rights violations committed by Mexican security forces are not only deplorable in their own right, but also significantly undermine the effectiveness of Mexico’s public security efforts. Building trust between the Mexican people and the government is essential to gathering information to dismantle organized crime. When security forces commit grave human rights violations and they are not held accountable for their actions, they lose that trust, alienating key allies and leaving civilians in a state of terror and defenselessness. It is thus in the interest of both of our countries to help Mexico curb systematic human rights violations, ensure that violations are effectively investigated and those responsible held accountable, and assess candidly the progress Mexico is making towards improving accountability and transparency. ¶ Evidence demonstrates that Mexico is not fulfilling effectively any of the requirements established by Congress, particularly those dealing with prosecuting military abuses and torture:

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#### Interpretation – economic engagement requires expanding bilateral economic relations

**Kahler, 6** - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (M., “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications)

Economic engagement - a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations - is a subject of growing interest in international relations. Most research on economic statecraft emphasizes coercive policies such as economic sanctions. This emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa, 1994; Pollins, 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how often strategies of economic engagement are deployed: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno, 2003). Beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies of economic engagement have been limited to the policies of great powers (Mastanduno, 1992; Davis, 1999; Skalnes, 2000; Papayoanou & Kastner, 1999/2000; Copeland, 1999/2000; Abdelal & Kirshner, 1999/2000). However, engagement policies adopted by South Korea and one other state examined in this study, Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics and that it may be more widespread than previously recognized.

#### This means the plan has to be government-to-government – not civil or private economic engagement

**Daga, 13** - director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation (Sergio, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic:

U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela”, National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15, <http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message_to_Debaters_6-7-13.pdf>)

Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3) international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with respect to some countries than to others.

#### ‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005**

(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

Violation: <the plan is not government to government>

#### **A) limits – a government limit is the only way to keep the topic manageable – otherwise they could use any 3rd party intermediary, lift barriers to private engagement, or target civil society – it makes topic preparation impossible**

#### **B) negative ground – formal governmental channels are key to predictable relations and trade disads and counterplans that test ‘engagement’**

## 1NC

**The means all parts**

**Merriam-Websters, 8** [Online Collegiate Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary]

4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole <the elite>

**“Federal Government” is all three branches**

**Truman Library, No Date** (Harry S. Truman: Library and Museum- One of thirteen presidential libraries, “Three Branches of Government”, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/teacher_lessons/3branches/1.htm>) MaxL

Our federal government has three parts. They are the Executive, (President and about 5,000,000 workers) Legislative (Senate and House of Representatives) and Judicial (Supreme Court and lower Courts).

**Violation: the plan only uses one advantage of the USFG**

**That’s bad – it destroys neg ground allowing the aff to spike out of politics links and agent counterplans**

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#### A deal to stall Iran’s nuclear program is coming – Obama will hold off Senate sanctions now – key to prevent Iran prolif

Landler and Sanger 11/14 (Mark and David, New York Times, Obama Calls for Patience in Iran Talks, 11/14/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/us/politics/obama-iran.html?\_r=0)

President Obama made a vigorous appeal to Congress on Thursday to give breathing space to his efforts to forge a nuclear deal with Iran, and the prospects for an interim agreement may have improved with the release of a report by international inspectors who said that for the first time in years, they saw evidence that the Iranians have put the brakes on their nuclear expansion.¶ The inspectors, from the International Atomic Energy Agency, said that very few new advanced centrifuges had been installed since President Hassan Rouhani of Iran took office in June, promising a new start with the West, and that little significant progress has been made on the construction of a new nuclear reactor, which became a point of contention in negotiations in Geneva last week.¶ The slowdown, according to diplomats familiar with the Iranian work, was clearly political, not driven by technical problems. But it was also easily reversible, suggesting that Iran was waiting to see what kind of relief from sanctions it could obtain from the West in the negotiations.¶ The report was immediately seized on by advocates and critics of an agreement that was almost signed in Geneva.¶ Administration officials said Iran’s restraint was the latest in a series of signals by Mr. Rouhani that he was an agent of change, and that it was an answer to skeptics who have said the Iranian leader was all talk and no action.¶ But critics in Congress and overseas dismissed the report, saying that Iran had not removed any centrifuges and continued to enrich uranium at a steady rate. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, one of the most vocal critics of a deal, said the only reason Iran had not expanded its enrichment capability was that “they don’t need to.”¶ For Mr. Obama, who has been fending off accusations that the American negotiators were giving away too much to Iran in return for concessions that critics said would scarcely slow its march to nuclear capability, the findings could fortify his argument that the Senate should hold off on new sanctions to avoid derailing the talks.¶ “Let’s test how willing they are to actually resolve this diplomatically and peacefully,” Mr. Obama said at a White House news conference. “We will have lost nothing if at the end of the day it turns out that they are not prepared to provide the international community the hard proof and assurances necessary for us to know that they’re not pursuing a nuclear weapon.”¶ The confidential report was released to the nuclear agency’s member states just minutes before Mr. Obama spoke, and he did not mention the findings. But the president made a strong case for diplomacy, trying to quell an effort in Congress to ramp up sanctions against Iran rather than modestly ease them, in return for a six-month halt in the progress of the nuclear program.¶ Negotiators plan to meet again next week in Geneva, after failing to reach an interim deal because of what Secretary of State John Kerry has described as a difference in only four or five phrases. The prospect that a deal could be reached soon has provoked a storm of protest from Israel and criticism from Republicans and some Democrats.¶ The I.A.E.A. report does not show anything close to an across-the-board freeze or rollback in Iran’s program. Iran continues to produce low-enriched uranium around the pace it has in the past. But inspectors, who completed their last visit to Iran just days ago, said that no more new, highly efficient centrifuges that the country has invested heavily in building were installed at its two main nuclear sites. Those centrifuges, called the IR-2, were particularly worrisome because they would shorten Iran’s “breakout time” to build a weapon, if they were operating.¶ The report said that Iran, at its Fordo plant near the city of Qum, had not put more of its existing 2,710 centrifuges into operation. Only 696 of the installed machines, all of the older IR-1 model, are actually enriching uranium — well below the plant’s capacity.¶ Iran’s stockpile of its most worrisome category of uranium — enriched to nearly 20 percent, close to bomb grade — increased only modestly. Since the last quarterly accounting, Iran has added roughly 10 kilograms, or about 22 pounds, of uranium enriched to 20 percent purity to its stockpile, bringing its total of the medium-enriched material to roughly 196 kilograms, or about 432 pounds. Iran is turning most of that uranium into fuel for reactors, which diminishes its threat as a bomb fuel.¶ The report also found that Iran had performed only minor work on the heavy-water reactor at Arak, a facility that has raised alarm because it could eventually produce plutonium, giving Iran a second source of bomb fuel.¶ Nader Karimi Joni, a political analyst close to the Rouhani administration, said, “It is fair to say that Iran is showing good will, just like the European Union and the United States have done.”

**The plan puts border security before the rest of immigration reform – kills the deal**

**Grant, 13** (4-27, David, Politics for the Christian Science Monitor, “How border security 'trigger' could stop immigration reform.” The CSM, 4/27/13 ln//GBS-JV)

Congressional negotiators say immigration reform will need a border security 'trigger' to pass. But agreeing on what counts as 'border security' won't be easy, and could determine whether reform happens. Immigration reformers want to bring the more than 10 million undocumented immigrants out of the shadows. Border security hawks want assurances that if they go along with that plan, they won’t be back in 10 years deciding whether or not to legalize 10 million more. What’s Congress to do?¶ Figure out a “trigger,” where advances in border security are deemed sufficient to trigger the beginning of the journey to citizenship for the undocumented already in the country.¶ As immigration reform negotiations continue, determining just what counts as a “secure border” and how to link that to plans for the undocumented will be crucial. Indeed, finding an answer could determine whether a bipartisan immigration reform measure reaches President Obama’s desk or if 2013 is yet another disappointment for reformers. Historically, those on Capitol Hill have tried to craft a delicate balance between border security and a path to legal status for the undocumented. For example, the comprehensive immigration reform legislation of the George W. Bush years, which ultimately failed, had a series of triggers. In 2009, Sen. Chuck Schumer (D) of New York proposed more broadly that “operational control” of the border “must be achieved within a year of enactment of legislation.”¶ But those triggers aren't helpful anymore. Most of the benchmarks for border security established in 2007, for example, have been met today, according to an analysis by the pro-reform advocacy group America’s Voice.¶ Border patrol staffing north of 20,000? Check: there are more than 21,000 agents on the border at present. Requirements for unmanned drones and a variety of other observation methods? All are at or above the 2007 requirements today. Fencing? Within eight miles of the 2007 target. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said on Tuesday that while the department lacks a single measure on which to base a trigger – and that a trigger based on any single measure would be a bad idea – all the data DHS collects point to a border safer than ever before.¶ Some Democrats and immigration reform advocates take this to say that the border is secure already and should not stand in the way of the undocumented becoming US citizens even if further border security measures are needed.¶ Republican reformers like Sen. John McCain of Arizona have a slightly different view, holding that while the southern border certainly is far improved from nearly a decade ago there’s still plenty of room for improvement.¶ “There's no question there's been a significant reduction in illegal crossings over the past five years…. But that work is not yet complete,” Senator McCain said in January at the press conference announcing a bipartisan Gang of Eight’s principles.¶ Other Republicans, like Sen. Jeff Sessions (R) of Alabama, are skeptical of such claims and believe figuring out just what constitutes a secure border should be among the goals of a lengthy series of hearings around immigration reform.¶ So what do lawmakers propose to do this time around? Mr. Obama’s answer appears to be scrap the trigger altogether.¶ His immigration statements have notably left out any linkage between border security and permanent legal status for the undocumented, noting in his immigration reform plan that if an undocumented person meets certain criteria including paying fines, learning English, and waiting until all other current prospective immigrants have passed through the immigration system, “there will be no uncertainty about their ability to become US citizens.”

#### Capital key – prevents confrontation

Cockburn 11/11 Patrick, author of Muqtada: Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq, Why Iran’s Concessions Won’t Lead to a Nuclear Agreement, 11/11/13, http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/11/11/why-irans-concessions-wont-lead-o-a-nuclear-agreement/

On the other hand, the decision by President Obama not to launch airstrikes against Syria, Iran’s crucial Arab ally, after the use of chemical weapons on 21 August, has to a degree demilitarised the political atmosphere. This could go into reverse if Congress adds even tougher sanctions and threats of military action by Israel resume. Much will depend on how much political capital President Obama is willing spend to prevent prospects for a deal being extinguished by those who believe that confrontation with Iran works better than diplomacy.

#### Deal key to prevent war and Iran prolif

Shank and Gould 9/12 Michael Shank, Ph.D., is director of foreign policy at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Kate Gould is legislative associate for Middle East policy at FCNL, No Iran deal, but significant progress in Geneva, 9/12/13, http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/cause-conflict-conclusion/2013/nov/12/no-iran-deal-significant-progress-geneva/

Congress should welcome, not stubbornly dismiss, diplomatic efforts to finalize the interim accord and support the continued conversation to reach a more comprehensive agreement. The sanctions that hawks on the Hill are pushing derail such efforts and increase the prospects of war. ¶ There is, thankfully, a growing bipartisan contingent of Congress who recognizes that more sanctions could undercut the delicate diplomatic efforts underway. Senator Carl Levin, D-Mich., chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, cautioned early on that, “We should not at this time impose additional sanctions.” ¶ Senator Tim Johnson, D-S.D., chair of the Banking Committee, is still weighing whether to press forward with new sanctions in his committee. Separately, as early as next week, the Senate could vote on Iran sanctions amendments during the chamber’s debate on the must-pass annual defense authorization bill.¶ This caution against new sanctions, coming from these more sober quarters of the Senate, echoes the warnings from a wide spectrum of former U.S. military officials against new sanctions. There is broad recognition by U.S. and Israeli security officials that the military option is not the preferred option; a diplomatic one is. ¶ This widespread support for a negotiated solution was highlighted last week when 79 national security heavyweights signed on to a resounding endorsement of the Obama Administration’s latest diplomatic efforts.¶ Any member of Congress rejecting a diplomatic solution moves the United States toward another war in the Middle East. Saying no to this deal-in-the-works, furthermore, brings the world no closer toward the goal of Iran giving up its entire nuclear program. Rather, it would likely result in an unchecked Iranian enrichment program, while the United States and Iran would teeter perilously close on the brink of war. ¶ A deal to prevent war and a nuclear-armed Iran is within reach and it would be dangerous to let it slip away. Congress can do the right thing here, for America’s security and Middle East’s stability, and take the higher diplomatic road. Pandering to harsh rhetoric and campaign contributors is no way to sustain a foreign policy agenda. It will only make America and her assets abroad less secure, not more. The time is now to curb Iran’s enrichment program as well as Congress’s obstructionism to a peaceful path forward.

#### US-Iran war causes global nuclear war and collapses the global economy

Avery 11/6 John Scales, Lektor Emeritus, Associate Professor, at the Department of Chemistry, University of Copenhagen, since 1990 he has been the Contact Person in Denmark for Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War, 11/6/13, http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm

Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences.¶ As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems.¶ The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy.¶ In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result.¶ Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.

## US Econ

No impact – they never read a terminal impact to econ collapse

There is no brink to economic collapse coming in the squo

#### Decline doesn’t cause conflict.

Gelb 10 - Leslie H., President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations; was a senior official in the U.S. Defense Department from 1967 to 1969 and in the State Department from 1977 to 1979, November/December 2010, “GDP Now Matters More Than Force,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6

To an unprecedented degree, the major powers now need one another to grow their economies, and they are loath to jeopardize this interdependence by allowing traditional military and strategic competitions to escalate into wars. In the past, U.S. enemies--such as the Soviet Union--would have rejoiced at the United States' losing a war in Afghanistan. Today, the United States and its enemies share an interest in blocking the spread of both Taliban extremism and the Afghan-based drug trade. China also looks to U.S. arms to protect its investments in Afghanistan, such as large natural-resource mines. More broadly, no great nation is challenging the balance of power in either Europe or Asia. Although nations may not help one another, they rarely oppose one another in explosive situations. Given the receding threat of great-power war, leaders around the world can afford to elevate economic priorities as never before. To be sure, leaders throughout history have pursued economic strength as the foundation of state power, but power itself was equated with military might. Today, the prevailing idea is that economic strength should be applied primarily toward achieving economic--not military--ends. Money is what counts most, so most nations limit their spending on standing armies and avoid military interventions. What preoccupies most leaders is trade, investment, access to markets, exchange rates, additional riches for the rich, and a better life for the rest. This trend is plain among the rising regional powers known as the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and among such others as Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey. Although these countries' leaders have major security concerns--such as India with regard to Pakistan--their paramount objective has become economic strength. For most, economic growth is their prime means of fending off internal political opposition. China makes perhaps the best case for the primacy of economics. Although it might emerge as a spoiler decades hence, Beijing currently promotes the existing economic order and does not threaten war. Because Beijing has been playing the new economic game at a maestro level--staying out of wars and political confrontations and zeroing in on business--its global influence far exceeds its existing economic strength. China gains extra power from others' expectations of its future growth. The country has become a global economic giant without becoming a global military power. Nations do not fear China's military might; they fear its ability to give or withhold trade and investments.

**No impact- econ decline doesn’t cause war**

Barnett ‘9(Thomas P.M. Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” 8/25/2009)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: \* No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); \* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); \* Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); \* No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); \* A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and \* No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

## Mexico Stability

No impact – they don’t have a terminal impact to terrorism

Empirics disprove – Mexico has had a weak economy since 2002

#### Terrorists won’t pursue or use nuclear weapons

**Waltz, 03** (Kenneth, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2003, p. 130)

For terrorists who abandon tactics of disruption and harassment in favor of dealing in wholesale death and destruction, instruments other than nuclear weapons are more readily available. Poisons and germs are easier to get than nuclear weapons, and poisoning a city’s water supply, though rather complicated, is more easily done than blowing a city up. Nevertheless, terrorists may seek to gain control of nuclear materials and use them to threaten or destroy. Yet, with shaky control of nuclear weapons materials in Russia and perhaps in Pakistan, and with the revelation in 1994 that the United States had lost track of some of its nuclear materials, one can hardly believe that nuclear weapons spreading to another country or two every now and then adds much to the chances that terrorists will be able to buy or steal nuclear materials. Plentiful sources are already available. Nuclear terror is a problem distinct from the spread of nuclear weapons to a few more countries. Terrorists have done a fair bit of damage by using conventional weapons and have sometimes got their way by threatening to use them. Might terrorists not figure they can achieve more still by threatening to explode nuclear weapons on cities of countries they may wish to bend to their bidding? Fear of nuclear terror arises from the assumption that if terrorists *can* get nuclear weapons they *will* get them, and then all hell will break loose. This is comparable to assuming that if weak states get nuclear weapons, they will use them for aggression. Both assumptions are false. Would the courses of action we fear, if followed, promise more gains than losses or more pains than profits? The answers are obvious. Terrorists have some hope of reaching their long-term goals through patient pressure and constant harassment. They cannot hope to do so by issuing unsustainable threats to wreak great destruction, threats they would not want to execute anyway.

#### 2. No risk of nuclear terrorism—can’t get material, can’t make the bomb, and can’t bring it into the US

**Chapman, 08** (Steve, member of the Chicago Tribune editorial board since 1981, “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism”, <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the_implausibility_of_nuclear.html>)

But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple -- say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb -- it's reasonable to ask if they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small." The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally -- for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment -- plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time -- but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong. That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably won't bother.

# 2NC

## Econ

**Diversionary theory --- it’s wrong**

Boehmer, 07 – political science professor at the University of Texas (Charles, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict” Pismarov)

This article examines the contemporaneous effect of low economic growth and domestic instability on the threat of regime change and/ or involvement in external militarized conflicts. Many studies of diversionary conflict argue that lower rates of economic growth should heighten the risk of international conflict. Yet we know that militarized interstate conflicts, and especially wars, are generally rare events whereas lower rates of growth are not. Additionally, a growing body of literature shows that regime changes are also associated with lower rates of economic growth. The question then becomes which event, militarized interstate conflict or regime change, is the most likely to occur with domestic discord and lower rates of economic growth? Diversionary theory claims that leaders seek to divert attention away from domestic problems such as a bad economy or political scandals, or to garner increased support prior to elections. Leaders then supposedly externalize discontented domestic sentiments onto other nations, sometimes as scapegoats based on the similar in-group/out-group dynamic found in the research of Coser (1956) and Simmel (1955), where foreign countries are blamed for domestic problems. This process is said to involve a “rally-round-the-flag” effect, where a leader can expect a short-term boost in popularity with the threat or use of force (Blechman, Kaplan, and Hall 1978; Mueller 1973). Scholarship on diversionary conflict has focused most often on the American case1 but recent studies have sought to identify this possible behavior in other countries.2 The Falklands War is often a popular example of diversionary conflict (Levy and Vakili 1992). Argentina was reeling from hyperinflation and rampant unemployment associated with the Latin American debt crisis. It is plausible that a success in the Falklands War may have helped to rally support for the governing Galtieri regime, although Argentina lost the war and the ruling regime lost power. How many other attempts to use diversionary tactics, if they indeed occur, can be seen to generate a similar outcome? The goal of this article is to provide an assessment of the extent to which diversionary strategy is a threat to peace. Is this a colorful theory kept alive by academics that has little bearing upon real events, or is this a real problem that policy makers should be concerned with? If it is a strategy readily available to leaders, then it is important to know what domestic factors trigger this gambit. Moreover, to know that requires an understanding of the context in external conflict, which occurs relative to regime changes. Theories of diversionary conflict usually emphasize the potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equal attention to the prospective costs associated with such behavior. It is not contentious to claim that leaders typically seek to remain in office. However, whether they can successfully manipulate public opinion regularly during periods of domestic unpopularity through their states’ participation in foreign militarized conflicts—especially outside of the American case—is a question open for debate. Furthermore, there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies of domestic conflict and regime change. Lower rates of economic growth are purported to increase the risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internal conflicts) as well as regime changes (Bloomberg and Hess 2002). This implies that if leaders do, in fact, undertake diversionary conflicts, many may still be thrown from the seat of power—especially if the outcome is defeat to a foreign enemy. Diversionary conflict would thus seem to be a risky gambit (Smith 1996). Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988) have nevertheless questioned the validity of the diversionary thesis. As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarely formulated as a cohesive and comprehensive theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later analyses do not necessarily build on past studies and the discrepancies between inquiries are often difficult to unravel. “Studies have used a variety of research designs, different dependent variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering different time periods and different states” (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000, 39). To these problems, we should add a lack of theoretical precision and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring to the linkages between economic conditions and domestic strife that remain unclear in some studies (Miller 1995; Russett 1990). Consequently, extant studies are to a degree incommensurate; they offer a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations and tests of economic growth and interstate conflict. Yet a few studies have attempted to provide deductive explanations about when and how diversionary tactics might be employed. Using a Bayesian updating game, Richards and others (1993) theorize that while the use of force would appear to offer leaders a means to boost their popularity, a poorly performing economy acts as a signal to a leader’s constituents about his or her competence. Hence, attempts to use diversion are likely to fail either because incompetent leaders will likewise fail in foreign policy or people will recognize the gambit for what it is. Instead, these two models conclude that diversion is likely to be undertaken particularly by risk-acceptant leaders. This stress on a heightened risk of removal from office is also apparent in the work of Bueno de Mesquita and others (1999), and Downs and Rocke (1994), where leaders may “gamble for resurrection,” although the diversionary scenario in the former study is only a partial extension of their theory on selectorates, winning coalitions, and leader survival. Again, how often do leaders fail in the process or are removed from positions of power before they can even initiate diversionary tactics? A few studies focusing on leader tenure have examined the removal of leaders following war, although almost no study in the diversionary literature has looked at the effects of domestic problems on the relative risks of regime change, interstate conflict, or both events occurring in the same year.3

## Neoliberalism

**Their risk calculus is born out of neoliberal logic---uncertainty is a trick used to either promote or reject policy based on ideological predispositions**

Pellizzoni 11, Associate Professor of Environmental Sociology at the University of Trieste, Italy, April 2011, “Governing through disorder: Neoliberal environmental governance and social theory,” Global Environmental Change, Vol. 21, p. 795-803//VP

This article started out with two aims: ﬁrst, to identify at the deepest, ontological, level the underpinnings of widespread environmental policy approaches often associated with neoliberalism. Second, to show that different socio-environmental theoretical perspectives have had difﬁculty confronting these underpinnings, which affects their capacity to interpret the latter’s implications for the governance of the biophysical world. Neoliberalism draws on established traditions in political liberalism and market capitalism, yet is characterized by a novel understanding of the ontological quality of nature. ‘Nature’ is no longer conceived as an objectively given, though cognitively mediated, reality, but as a constitutively ﬂuid entity, a contingency purposefully produced and controlled for instrumental ends. Governance through uncertainty, instability or ‘disorder’ thus seems to be the distinguishing feature of the ‘neoliberalisation of nature’. This ideational core may be considered the ﬁrst reason for the sense of unity often felt when contemplating the array of sectors, approaches and cases characterizing current market-oriented environmental governance, and at the same time for the sense of uneasiness towards neoliberalism that environmental social theory conveys. Whatever the judgment, it is important to grasp what is at stake with neoliberal governance of nature. Browsing social science books and journals, one realizes that much critical energy has been focused on questioning the objectivist account of nature that allegedly dominates current policy narratives and practices. Only a discerning scholarship has begun to realize that objectivism and antiobjectivism are losing relevance as categories capable of distinguishing intellectual and stakeholder positions, and that they increasingly become claims usable in power games over the biophysical world. Attention, for example, has been recently paid to the instrumental use of uncertainty (Freudenburg et al., 2008; Jacques et al., 2008), which, depending on the circumstances, is used either to ask for policy-making (as with GMOs) or to call for policy-avoiding (as with ‘unwarranted’ restrictive measures related to climate change). The very possibility of appealing to ‘sound science’ either for evidence of no problems, or no evidence of problems indicates the fundamentally anti-objectivist attitude that characterizes present political and cultural frameworks. Policy promoters share this attitude with their opponents. Those who ask for ‘precaution’ use the same arguments in reverse, requiring action when and where there is no evidence of no problems. 11 This commonality entails that appeals to uncertainty are devoid of any strategic relevance in current controversies; rather, they play a tactical role. This is likely to represent a problem above all for counter-forces to neoliberalism, to the extent that in a tactical struggle the most advantaged are those provided with greater organizational, economic, cognitive and legal resources (to say nothing of military ones). In short, we are today in front of a refashioning of the symbolic order of society vis-a` -vis its biophysical underpinnings. In this change, neoliberal discourses, policies and practices are at the same time a powerful driver and a result. Disorder becomes order to the extent that uncertainty, contingency and instability are regarded not as disabling by-products of governance but as enabling ways of governing. In the public realm, this ends up constituting a sort of shared horizon of meaning: not only is no new ‘order’ (in the traditional sense) in sight, but anti-essentialism overﬂows from intellectual avant-gardes to become a widespread, albeit often implicit or negotiable, worldview.

#### **Giving the tool of imagination over to the state exonerates us from responsibility – we should imagine our own role in violence**

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia \_ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

#### 4) Alt solves – empirics prove

**Munck, 03** - professor of Globalization and Social Exclusion (Ronaldo, Department of Sociology, Social Policy & Social Work Studies and Globalisation and Social Exclusion Unit, University of Liverpool, “Neoliberalism, necessitarianism and alternatives in Latin America: there is no alternative (TINA)?”, Third World Quarterly, Vol 24, No 3, pp 495–511, 2003, http://www-e.uni-magdeburg.de/evans/Journal%20Library/Trade%20and%20Countries/Neoliberalism,%20necessitarianism%20and%20alternatives%20in%20Latin%20America.pdf)//VP

If Argentina shows the downside of neoliberal globalisation at its starkest, we need to consider whether in neighbouring Brazil a more hopeful scenario is not now opening up with the historic victory of the Workers's Party candidate Luis Inacio 'Lula' de Silva in the 2002 presidential elections. In a bold political statement calling for an alternative to neoliberalism, Ciro Gomes and Roberto Unger declared in the mid 1990s that 'Todo o Brasil reclama a falta de proposta e de alternativa' (the whole of Brazil is complaining about the lack of proposals or alternatives) (Gomes & Unger, 1996: 17). But they admitted that, while the people want and need opposition, they have no faith in the opposition that exists. This is, as we shall argue, probably the main issue facing those seeking to articulate a progressive alternative to neoliberalism. Even as advocates and beneficiaries of this perspective/ideology/discourse begin to perceive the seams in this once seamless garment, the people still have confidence in it ('better the devil we know', etc). In this sense, politics is back in command and the ideologues of economic supremacy no longer hold sway over the discursive terrain. The main issues, in terms of the enduring popular credibility of the neoliberal economic project, are the heartfelt need for macroeconomic stability and the spectre of hyperinflation which caused so much devastation in the past.

Unger recognises clearly that what he calls the 'operative version' (my 'really existing') of neoliberalism enjoys a 'unity' that 'is social and political rather than narrowly economic and technical' (Unger, 1998: 58). However, this unity is seen as a negative consensus around disabling the state and disempowering govern- ment. Thus an alternative project to the dominant one of real neoliberalism would need to build a broad political alliance as well as to offer economic policies better able to carry out the productive revolution that the region needs. Raising the level of public and private savings is essential for Unger but, equally, so is the development of institutional arrangements which can channel this into productive investment, not into the global financial casino. To break with the dualism created or exacerbated by globalisation-between those integrated into the circuits of the 'new' capitalism and those who are not-is an economic issue but also, of course, a task of massive social, political and cultural dimensions. The imagination of an alternative may be possible then, but what about its practical implementation? Towards the end of 1997 an influential group of centre-left politicians and intellectuals (led by Unger and Mexico's soon to be elevated to Foreign Minister, Jorge Castanieda) issued the Consenso de Buenos Aires (CBA, 1997) intended as a full-frontal attack on the Washington Consensus. Monetary stability is therein recognised as a sine qua non ('bandera indeclinable'-unfurlable banner) and globalisation is basically taken for granted. From the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) structuralist tradition are derived the need for endogenous growth and the truism that growth and welfare are not a zero-sum equation. Much emphasis is placed on the institutional arrangements necessary to achieve social regulation of the market, but then the IDB was also saying at the time that 'Institutions matter', as we saw above. In summary the CBA could be considered a realist social democratic alternative seeking to confront the social exclusionary processes inherent in neoliberal globalisation. It would seem that a reformist alternative to the status quo is possible; whether it is a revolutionary reform in Unger's terms, promoting further transformation, has yet to be seen. In the cities of Brazil controlled by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT- Worker's Party) we have seen the germs of a progressive alternative to neo- liberalism. The experience of Porto Alegre's 'participative budget' experiment since l998 has attracted international attention, being dubbed 'an experience of direct democracy without parallel in the world' (Cassen, 1998: 3). In its rigour and breadth this is no cosmetic exercise in 'municipal socialism' and the nearly three-and-a-half million citizens of the urban district of Porto Alegre have come to appreciate its value. There is active popular engagement with budget priorities from education to transport, health to crime, which then feeds in transparently to the actual budget implemented each year. How this experiment in direct democracy meshes (or not) with representative democracy is an open theoretical and practical issue (see Baierle, 2002, for a sceptical view). With a participation rate of 60% the participative budget has certainly engaged the population and it has also, through its transparent mechanisms, proven a strong antidote to the corruption that once permeated local government. At the local level the example of Porto Alegre shows there is a possible alternative to laissez faire economics.

However, many are now asking how the Workers' Party can possibly govern Brazil in the era of neoliberal globalisation and retain any radical principles at the same time. Will Lula not just say the same as Tony Blair did when he assumed office, namely that his 'hands are tied' by globalisation and that the need to maintain Brazil's 'competitiveness' on the world market must take precedence over any social reforms that might be desirable but not practicable? Certainly, the negative example of Argentina loomed large during the electoral campaign with the anti-Lula forces saying that if he was elected, the same would happen in Brazil. Now many on the left are asking whether the Workers' Party will 'live up to its name' and deliver radical policies. From both sides we see misconceptions of what is necessary and possible for a socially progressive political economy in Brazil. The left's critique of Cardoso's government (see for example Rocha, 2002) had already set the tone with unrealistic expectations being placed on progressive presidents. The fact is that Lula must govern having gained 91 (up from 58 in 1998) out of 513 deputies in the National Congress and 10 out of the 54 seats at stake in the Federal Senate. So, from the start the PT is not a hegemonic governing force. The case of Argentina shows the danger of national disintegration as the provinces of that country engage in a 'beggar thy neighbour' strategy in the midst of economic collapse. Brazil will probably display the dangers associated with inflated popular expectations of what can be achieved in terms of socioeconomic reform. As it happens the Workers Party has put forward a rational and progressive economic strategy and I believe this is not only to 'retain investors' confidence' or to 'placate Washington' (although these considerations may not be irrelevant, see Burgos, 2002). The Workers Party government plan recognises that the first challenge is to develop a 'less vulnerable economy' and to regain strong growth rates. It argues for the need to 'create a climate of stability' and to maintain control over inflation. Its first axis of development is the social and the second is 'strengthening the national economy'. Thus poverty eradication, dealing with unemployment and redressing the severe socioeconomic inequalities are placed first. Yet this is only seen as possible with a long-term strategic plan, and state planning is certainly given a key role, one that it never entirely lost in Brazil anyway. Urban regeneration and infrastructure development are seen as key in this regard. But, in explicit contrast to 1950s and 1960s developmentalism (desenvolvimentismo) this national development model is set in the context of improving national 'competi- tiveness' (Pr, Programa de Governo, 2002). Of course there will be many changes to this bold manifesto, and no doubt backtracking, but this seems very much like a 'high road' type strategy and consonant with the Chilean neo- structuralists' call for 'growth with equity' (see Sunkel, 1995). In the Argentinian context Lula's declared intention to prioritise the Mercosur is also highly significant and by no means a minor regionalist gesture.

#### 5) It’s try or die for the alt—individual resistance is crucial.

**Makwana 6** (Rajesh, STWR, 23rd November 06, <http://www.stwr.org/globalization/neoliberalism-and-economic-globalization.html>)//VP

Conclusion

Neoliberal ideology embodies an outdated, selfish model of economy. It has been formulated by the old imperial powers and adopted by economically dominant nations. Given the state of the global trade and finance structures, wealthy countries can maintain their economic advantage by pressurizing developing countries to adopt neo-liberal policies – even though they themselves do not. Understandably, many commentators have described this process as economic colonialism.

The ultimate goal of neoliberal economic globalization is the removal of all barriers to commerce, and the privatization of all available resources and services. In this scenario, public life will be at the mercy of volatile market forces, and the extracted profits will benefit the few.

The major failures of these policies are now common knowledge. Many countries, particularly in Latin America, are now openly defying the foreign corporate rule that was forced upon them by the international financial institutions. In these countries, economic ideologies based on competition and self interest are gradually being replaced by policies based on cooperation and the sharing of resources. Changing well-established political and economic structures is a difficult challenge, but pressure for justice is bubbling upward from the public. Change is crucial if the global public is to manage the essentials for life and ensure that all people have access to them as their human right.

#### NADBank is neoliberal- theUS commodifies Mexico to be used as a tool

Vanderpool 6 (Tim Vanderpool, “NADBank Blues: Will Border Cleanup Efforts Be Abandoned,” 04/13/2006, http://www.tucsonweekly.com/tucson/nadbank-blues/Content?oid=1083801)//VP

Still, the NADBank has been no stranger to criticism. Environmentalists condemn its secretive operating style, while others have chastised the bank's inability to offer lower-interest loans to desperately poor communities.¶ Congress liberalized the finance rate structure in 2001, allowing the bank more loan flexibility. But the criticism has nonetheless grown among U.S. Treasury Department officials, who target the bank's administrative costs totaling about $80 million over the past dozen years.¶ There are also NADBank critics south of the line. According to Hugh Holub, they include officials at Mexico's treasury department, Hacienda. "We were getting info that the attack (on NADBank) was coming from Hacienda," Holub says. "The EPA reaches through the NADBank to (provide grants). So you have the EPA setting all these terms and conditions for spending that money. The Mexicans didn't particularly like having conditions imposed on them--conditions that were impinging on their sovereignty."¶ Attempts to contact Hacienda officials for comment were unsuccessful.¶ Nancy Woo is associate director of the EPA's Region 9 Water Division. She denies that the agency is heavy-handed in Mexico. "I don't think that's an issue," she says from her San Francisco office. For example, "We have a very good working relationship with (Mexico's) federal water authority."¶ This conflict hit a fever pitch last year, when word leaked out that NADBank's future was under discussion between U.S. Treasury and Hacienda negotiators. Those murky bull sessions reportedly included disbanding the NADBank altogether.¶ Such claims are denied by Brookly McLaughlin, a Treasury Department spokeswoman. "There has probably been some confusion," she says. "There were all these reports that we were talking about closing the bank, and we never said that. We had no intention to close the bank."¶ Not true, says NADBank spokesman Juan Antonio Flores. "We learned in late January that there were discussions among some representatives at the U.S. Treasury and Hacienda," he says. "They were looking at the role of the bank and what its future may be. Among options being considered was possible closure of the bank."¶ Still, Treasury Department officials have been more honest about their ongoing complaints. "Our concern is with the functioning of the bank," says McLaughlin. "We think the administrative costs are pretty high.”

#### The affirmative’s approach to the economy assures catastrophic collapse—the economy is too hard for us to understand

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Are we beyond Speed and Politics? What characterizes contemporary politics is the unstable mixture of speed information and slow movements. Like the slow implosion of the manufacturing economy, the slow rise of evangelical visions of catastrophe, the slow ascent -- the slow ubiquity -- of the speed of technology, the slow descent of culture into the cold state of surveillance under the sign of bio-governance. You can see it everywhere. In the world economy, the speed of mortgage backed securities, credit swap debt offerings, and complex derivatives always seeks to move at the speed of light. Iceland is the world's first country actually liquidated by hyperreality with debts amassed at light-speeds now constituting 10 times its national wealth. Like Michel Serres' the perfect parasite, the Wall Street financial elite has worked a perfect number on the host of the world economies -- implanting unknown levels of toxic debt everywhere in the circulatory system of finance capital, from China and Japan to the European community. Waking up to the danger of hot debt moving at light-speed when it is definitely too late, Japanese bankers suddenly declaim that "It is beyond panic." Wall Street types say it is "panic with a capital P." Harvard economists, standing on the sidelines like a chorus of lament, wisely add that we are now between "capitulation and panic" and "debt is good." That in a world of over-extended economies, sudden loss of financial credibility, and a seizing up of credit mechanisms everywhere, the only thing to do, financially speaking, is wait for the capitulation point -- that fatal moment when despair is so deep, pessimism so locked down tight in the investor's heart, that everything just stops for an instant. No investments, no hope, no circulation. And for the always hopeful financial analysts, this is precisely the point to begin anew, to reinvest, to seize financial redemption from despair. Definitely then, not a speed economy, but a politics and economy of complex recursive loops, trapped in cycles of feedback which no one seems to understand, but with very real, very slow consequences: like vanishing jobs, abandoned health care and trashed communities. In The City of Panic, Virilio writes about the "tyranny of real time," "this accident in time belonging to an event that is the fruit of a technological progress out of political control." For Virilio, we're now interpellated by a complex, three dimensional space-time involved in the acceleration of technological progress "that reduces the extent, the fullness of the world to nothing." Or something else? Not really a fatal oscillation between fast technology and slow society, but hyper-technologies of global financial manipulation that can move so quickly because, just as Jean Baudrillard long ago warned, the hyperreal, simulational world of derivatives, credit swaps, and mortgage backed securities long ago blasted off from material reality, reaching escape velocity, and then orbiting the world as star-like high finance satellites -- purely virtual satellites which have no real meaning for the rest of us as long as they stay in space as part of the alienated, recursive loops of advanced capitalism. But when the meltdown suddenly happens, when that immense weight of over-indebtedness and toxic mortgages and credit derivates plunge back into the gravitational weight of real politics and real economy, we finally know what it is to live within trajectories of the catastrophic. Economists are quoted as saying the financial crisis effects "everyone on earth." Is this Virilio's "global accident?" Quite certainly it is panic finance: that moment when the credit mechanisms necessary for capitalist liquidity slam shut, a time made to measure for Virilio's brilliant theory of bunker archeology, with each bank its own toxic bunker of junk assets, each banker a born again socialist. For example, always vigilant automatic circuit breakers working in the darkness of night recently prevented a global plunge of the futures market. Allan Greenspan throws up his hands, exclaiming "I'm in shocked disbelief."

#### 2) Neoliberalism makes extinction inevitable—we control terminal impact uniqueness.

**Korten, Ph.D., 2** –et al – David C. Korten, Nicanor Perlas, and Vandana Shiva, December 2002, BA in psychology from Stanford University, MBA and Ph.D. degrees from the Stanford Business School, former Associate Professor of the Harvard University Graduate School of Business, activists. “GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: THE PATH AHEAD,” http://davidkorten.org/CivilSocietyPathAhead

At the end of World War II, a series of national liberation movements freed the world from the institutions of conventional colonialism. The world celebrated the end of empire and the rise of a new era of democracy, peace, prosperity, and community. The celebration proved to be premature. The forces of empire soon re-emerged under the mantle of development and a promise to banish poverty from the face of the earth. Development, however, turned out to be largely a program to facilitate a new cycle of expropriation by the strong of the resources of the weak and led to the emergence of global financial markets and corporations as the de fact governing institutions of the planet. Development continued a pattern of much longer duration by which the institutions of empire transfer to themselves, and thus to elite control, ever more of the planet’s common heritage wealth that people and communities have nurtured, shared, and protected for millennia — including the lands, water, seeds, and biodiversity essential to life and well-being. The pattern has been continuously repeated. First, the state exercises its power of eminent domain to claim control of common heritage resources, such as forests and communal lands, in the name of development and a larger public interest. Then the state privatizes the assets in the name of economic efficiency. Once privatized, life-essential resources originally accessible to all as a gift of creation are commodified and monopolized by private corporations that forever after demand private tribute or rent at a price of their choosing. Empire’s current agenda also calls for eliminating social safety nets while privatizing, commodifying and monopolizing essential public services, such as education, health care, water, and sanitation — thus depriving those who lack the ability to pay of the most fundamental of all human rights — the right to live. The human consequences of the transfer are masked by misdirecting attention to indicators of economic growth — a proxy for growth in the power of the institutions of money — as the measures of human progress to the neglect of more valid indicators of the well-being of people and nature. Insisting that economic growth increases the wealth of all and is a fitting proxy for human benefit, the forces of empire create **an illusion of progress** that hides a reality of decline in the economic security and well-being of the persons and households that bear the costs. For example, grain giants like Cargill lobby governments to create globally competitive economic regimes that sacrifice small farmers and food security. The structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and IMF and trade rules of the WTO force the removal of barriers to the entry of subsidized food imports from abroad that undermine small farmers and ultimately drive them out of business and off their land. The lands are then acquired by corporate interest to produce food for export to markets in wealthier countries. This earns foreign exchange to pay for food imports and repay foreign loans — in the process generating handsome profits for international grain traders and bankers, while those without money go hungry. A regime of household, community, and national food security is replaced with a global regime of food security for the rich and food insecurity for everyone else. To mask the reality, the forces of empire point to a growth in food exports as proof of the increasing health of the agricultural sector and evidence of a domestic food surplus — even in the face of **widespread malnutrition and starvation**. The legitimacy of badly flawed development projects rests on their claim to create abundance. More often they create scarcity by exploiting natural resources faster than nature can renew them and diverting what remains away from those who have less than they need to those who often have far more than they need. This creates a scarcity of land, water, forest, marine and other essential resources that condemns the excluded to a struggle for survival and fuels growing social conflict. Surrounded by violence and mindful of the incessant competition for power, even the rich feel an increasing sense of threat. The overall dynamic turns the corporate global economy into a **global suicide economy that is destroying the foundations of its own existence and** **threatening the survival of the human species**. The “terminator seed” — genetically engineered to eliminate its natural ability to reproduce itself — is a metaphor for the pathological economic system that created it. The 2002 UN World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa demonstrated all too clearly empire’s callous disregard for the plight of the poor and the environment. Johannesburg was supposed to have been the third in a series of Earth Summits focused on addressing the needs of life. The forces of empire were concerned that the meeting might lead to new environmental standards and regulations that could impose costs and restrictions detrimental to corporate power and profits. So with the strong backing of the U.S. government, they highjacked the conference and replaced the human and environmental agenda crafted 10 years earlier in Rio de Janeiro with the corporate agenda of the WTO. First they resurrected the fabrication that environmental protection is anti-poor and substituted poverty for the environment as the priority concern of the conference. They then, in denial of the evidence, brought forward the standard neoliberal fiction that economic growth is a path to prosperity for all and that deregulation, free trade, and privatization are the keys to growth. They did not achieve all their aims in Johannesburg, but they dealt a serious blow to the hope that the conference might advance the cause of people and nature.

# 1NR

## Politics

#### We control time frame and magnitude – deal failure draws in global powers and goes nuclear within months

PressTV 11/13

Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail, 11/13/13, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-fail/

A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in the coming months should the world powers fail to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, an American analyst says.¶ “If the talks fail, if the agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, then there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before [US President Barack] Obama leaves office and that’s a very great danger that no one can underestimate the importance of,” senior editor at the Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on Wednesday. ¶ “The United States could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculation and general roar,” Steinberg said. ¶ “So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don’t go forward, we could be facing a global conflict in the coming months and years and that’s got to be avoided at all costs when you’ve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with” their arsenals of “nuclear weapons,” he warned. ¶ The warning came one day after the White House told Congress not to impose new sanctions against Tehran because failure in talks with Iran could lead to war.

#### Negotiations are now or never – means the DA turns case before case turns the DA because waiting too long allows Iranian hardliners to scuttle negotiations

**Haass, 9/29/13** – president of the Council on Foreign Relations (Richard, “A Diplomatic Dance Will Be No Waltz for Either Iran or America” Financial Times,

<http://www.cfr.org/iran/diplomatic-dance-no-waltz-either-iran-america/p31517>)//VP

We will know soon enough. Both sides are in a hurry. The new Iranian leaders worry that time is against them. They fear that conservatives defeated in the June elections will rally, while the public will grow impatient if the sanctions-battered economy does not improve. Americans worry Iran is using time to get closer to creating an infrastructure able to produce fissile material, weaponise it and put warheads on missiles. Israeli officials do not hide their belief that under Mr Rouhani Iran will "smile its way to the bomb". All of which means this diplomatic dance will be no waltz. Sooner rather than later – certainly before next year is out – we should know if we will be toasting success or managing a crisis.

#### Destroys the world economy

**Phillips. 06** (Phillips Research Fellow for Middle East­ern Affairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Stud­ies, at The Heritage Foundation, 06 James, June 2, “U.S. Policy and Iran’s Nuclear Challenge” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Iran/hl942.cfm>)//VP

There is no guaranteed policy that can halt the Iranian nuclear program short of war, and even a military campaign may only delay Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. But U.S. policy­making regarding the Iranian nuclear issue inevita­bly boils down to a search for the least-bad option. And as potentially costly and risky as a preventive war against Iran would be, allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons would result in far heavier poten­tial costs and risks. The U.S. probably would be able to deter Iran from a direct nuclear attack on American or Israeli targets by threatening massive retaliation and the assured destruction of the Iranian regime. But there is a lingering doubt that a leader such as President Ahmadinejad, who reportedly harbors apocalyptic religious beliefs, would have the same cost-benefit calculus about a nuclear war as other leaders. The bellicose leader, who boldly called for Israel to be “wiped off the map” before he acquired a nuclear weapon, might be sorely tempted to follow through on his threat after he acquired one. Moreover, his regime might risk passing nuclear weapons off to terrorist surrogates in hopes of escaping retaliation for a nuclear surprise attack launched by an unknown attacker. Even if Iran could be deterred from considering such attacks, an Iranian nuclear breakout would undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that could lead Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, and Algeria to build or acquire their own nuclear weap­ons. Each new nuclear power would multiply the risks and uncertainties in an already volatile region. Iran also may be emboldened to step up its sup­port of terrorism and subversion, calculating that its nuclear capability would deter a military response. An Iranian miscalculation could easily lead to a future military clash with the United States or an American ally that would impose expo­nentially higher costs than a war with a non-nucle­ar Iran. Even if it could not threaten a nuclear missile attack on U.S. territory for many years, Tehran could credibly threaten to target the Saudi oil fields with a nuclear weapon, thereby gaining a potent blackmail threat over the world economy.

#### Turns terror

**Brookes,** **07** – National security affairs senior fellow (Peter, 4-2-07, “Iran Emboldened: Tehran Seeks to Dominate Middle East Politics”, DOA: 10-10-13, <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2007/04/iran-emboldened-tehran-seeks-to-dominate-middle-east-politics>)//VP

According to the U.S. State Department, Iran continues to be the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism. At the request of senior Iranian leadership, Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) support Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command with funding, training and weapons. Hezbollah - a Lebanese Shiite terrorist group - is a particular favorite. In fact, Iran established Hezbollah to parry Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Tehran may fund Hezbollah to the tune of $100 million per year. Last summer, Tehran's military support for Hezbollah was evident. Iran likely gave Hezbollah the green light to ambush an Israeli patrol and kidnap soldiers, which ultimately kicked off the monthlong conflict. In the ensuing days, Hezbollah indiscriminately fired as many as 10,000 Iran-supplied rockets and missiles into Israel. In addition, many were stunned when a C-802 cruise missile struck an Israeli naval vessel off the coast of Lebanon. While the shooter was never identified, the Chinese C-802 is in Iran's inventory. It could have been fired by either Hezbollah or the IRGC. Today, Hezbollah, with Iranian and Syrian support, is threatening to topple Lebanon's democratically elected government unless it is given additional cabinet seats - potentially giving it veto power over Beirut's decisions. Iran would love to add Lebanon to Syria as a client state in its effort to form an arc of Iranian influence across the region. Iran has made a number of not-so-veiled threats that it would deploy its irregular forces and terrorist allies against the U.S. and American interests, if necessary. This is likely not an idle threat. American blood is already on the hands of Iran and its terrorist proxies as a result of the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks attack and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, and in Iraq today. It is almost without question that Tehran sees its ability to hold U.S. interests at risk across the globe - including in the U.S. - as leverage against American military action over its nuclear program or meddling in Iraq. Perhaps the most frightening scenario is that Iran might transfer weapons of mass destruction capability to a terrorist ally. While this is risky behavior, it is a possibility. Iran could transfer nuclear capability to a Hezbollah-dominated government in Lebanon, or a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, significantly increasing the threat to Israeli security. Osama bin Laden has not been shy about his desire for WMD or al-Qaida's readiness to use them. The insurgency's recent use of chlorine gas in Iraq is evidence of a terrorist group's willingness to employ WMD.

**More evidence – it’s a sequencing thing – border security before the rest of immigration reform shuts down the compromise**

**DC ’13** [The Daily Caller, “Schumer: Legalizing Illegal immigrants won’t be stopped by border security needs” 1/31/13 http://dailycaller.com/2013/01/31/schumer-legalizing-illegal-immigrants-wont-be-stopped-by-border-security-needs/#ixzz2aSi9ejNQ//GBS-JV]

New York Democratic Sen. Chuck Schumer said securing the nation’s borders should not be used as “a barrier” to giving illegal immigrants living in the U.S. a pathway to citizenship.¶ ¶ “We want the border to be secure. It’s more secure than it was several years ago, but it has a ways to go. And different sectors need different types of security. It’s a lot different having security in the Tucson sector than off the stretch in Texas, which is bounded by the Rio Grande,” Schumer said on Thursday.¶ ¶ “But we’re not using border security as an excuse or block to the path of citizenship. We just want to make sure — and this is very important both substantively and politically — that there is a secure border, and we’re going to work for that. But it’s not — and Dick [Durbin] and I and Bob [Menendez], as well as our three Republican friends, want to make sure the border’s secure but not to use it as a barrier to prevent the 11 million from eventually gaining a path to citizenship.” Florida Republican Sen. Marco Rubio, who joined a bipartisan group to announce an immigration reform blueprint earlier this week, argues that increased border security should come before a pathway to citizenship.

**Democrats are key – their dissent wrecks the compromise**

**Hirschfeld, 13** (Julie, Politics for Bloomberg Business Week, 3-22-13, “Guest Worker Visas a Sticking Point on Immigration Rewrite,” Bloomberg, ln //GBS-JV]

With Senate Republicans and Democrats moving closer to an agreement to grant a chance at U.S. citizenship to 11 million undocumented immigrants, a long- simmering dispute between organized labor and the business lobby risks sapping the measure’s momentum. The two constituencies are at odds over a new program to provide U.S. work visas to low-skilled foreign workers, placing pressure on lawmakers poised for a compromise. Unions are pressing for a limited visa system that guarantees better wages for future immigrant workers, while businesses seek a broader program more responsive to their hiring needs. It’s the thornier side of what is otherwise a broadening consensus in both parties around an immigration plan, whose centerpiece is a path to U.S. citizenship for undocumented immigrants. A bipartisan group of eight senators is nearing a deal to bolster border security and workplace verification while revamping the legal immigration system. Republican Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, a member of the group, called the guest-worker issue “one of the more difficult parts” of the negotiations. “I’m not going to be part of a bill that doesn’t create a process whereby people can come to this country temporarily in the future if we need them,” Rubio said yesterday. “There’s no secret that the broader labor movement, with some exceptions, would rather not even have an immigration bill.” Political Consequences The disagreement carries significant political consequences for Republicans and Democrats alike, essentially making them choose between their strongest constituencies -- organized labor for Democrats and big business for Republicans -- and achievement of an overriding policy goal that both parties increasingly see as an electoral imperative. Hispanics accounted for 10 percent of voters in the 2012 presidential election. President Barack Obama won 71 percent of their votes, and just 27 percent backed Republican nominee Mitt Romney, who had proposed “self-deportation” for undocumented immigrants. Since then, a growing chorus of Republicans has publicly backed legal status for undocumented immigrants. Meanwhile, a group of Republican officials who unveiled a top-to-bottom review this week called for the party to back “comprehensive immigration reform” or see its appeal shrink. “It is in neither party’s interest for one group within a party to stop this, because it is bad for the economy if we don’t have immigration reform,” former Mississippi Governor and Republican National Committee Chairman Haley Barbour said this week, referring to labor unions’ objections to a guest-worker program. Worker Program Former Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell, a Democrat co- chairing an immigration task force with Barbour at the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington, said it is ultimately up to Obama to persuade Democrats not to abandon the bill if the immigrant-worker program doesn’t match the unions’ agenda. “If we don’t get guest-worker provisions that are exactly in line with what labor wants, we can’t hold up the bill because of that,” Rendell said. “We’ve got to do the best we can to preserve and protect the interests of organized labor, but in the end you can’t always get what you want.” Obama, he added, has “his work cut out for him**.”**

#### 2) trying to prevent new sanctions

ABC News 11/14

Obama to Congress: No New Sanctions on Iran, 11/14/13, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/obama-congress-sanctions-iran-20889710

President Barack Obama is urging Congress not to add new sanctions against Iran.¶ That's as the international community negotiates to ensure that Iran will not have the ability to develop nuclear weapons.¶ Obama says at a White House news conference that if Iran can't deliver on future promises and commitments, "the sanctions can be ramped back up."¶ The Obama administration has been pushing for more time to negotiate a deal with Iran that would protect Israel and U.S. interests in the Middle East and prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.¶ Obama says if the U.S. is serious about using diplomacy to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, there is no need to add new sanctions on top of sanctions already in place that have "crippled" Iran's economy.

#### 3) pushing Congress

Voice of Russia 11/14

Obama urges Congress against more Iran sanctions, 11/14/13, http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013\_11\_14/Obama-urges-Congress-against-more-Iran-sanctions-1873/

US President Barack Obama on Thursday urged Congress not to expand sanctions against Iran, saying a temporary deal under discussion could halt Tehran's nuclear capability by at least months.¶ Negotiations with Iran are the best way to ensure that Tehran does not acquire a nuclear weapon, meaning now is not the time to institute additional sanctions, US President Barack Obama said Thursday.¶ "Let's test how willing they are to actually resolve this diplomatically and peacefully, Obama told a press conference, while stressing the military option remained on the table.¶ He said he would encourage the US Congress not to move forward with proposed additional sanctions upon Iran, but instead allow ongoing talks to play out. That would mean offering some sanctions relief in return for concessions, while leaving most existing sanctions in place.

#### Budget Victory Gives Obama PC

By Steve Holland and Mark Felsenthal 10/17 2013 Crisis averted, Obama says Americans 'completely fed up' with Washington http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/17/us-usa-fiscal-obama-idUSBRE99G0R720131017

Hours after he signed into law a bill hastily cobbled together to end the crisis, Obama said events over the past two weeks had inflicted "completely unnecessary" damage on the U.S. economy.¶ An increase in borrowing costs caused by the near-debt default was harmful and consumers cut back on spending with hundreds of thousands of government workers suddenly idled, he said.¶ "There was no economic rationale for all of this," he said.¶ Though bruised by the battle, Obama emerged as the clear winner. He immediately sought to use the political capital gained to advance a domestic policy agenda centered around a fresh round of budget talks and an effort to win approval of two stalled items, immigration reform and a farm bill.¶ He did not mention an urgent challenge facing him now: Repairing the flaws in his signature healthcare law that have prevented many Americans from even signing up for it.¶ Obama issued an aggressive challenge to Congress, particularly the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, to stop focusing on who wins and loses political battles and get to work with him on issues critical to improving the economy.

#### Obama’s new agenda reflects his capital – sufficient PC now

Associated Press 10/17 Obama: Focus on Budget, Immigration, Farm Bill, 10/17/13, http://www.kristv.com/news/obama-focus-on-budget-immigration-farm-bill/

The government shutdown behind him, President Barack Obama focused Thursday on a new, trimmed down agenda by challenging Congress to overcome bitter partisan division and pass a budget and a farm bill and overhaul immigration.¶ The president said getting through those three priorities would help Washington move beyond "the cloud of crisis" created by the 16-day partial shuttering of government operations. But he acknowledge the political reality that even passing such a slimmed-down agenda by the end of the year will be tough.¶ "To all my friends in Congress, understand that how business is done in this town has to change because we've all got a lot of work to do on behalf of the American people, and that includes the hard work of regaining their trust," Obama said from the White House, the morning after signing a painfully forged bipartisan deal to reopen the government and avert a default.¶ Obama has slashed his wish list from earlier this year, when he called for legislation to address climate change, an increase in the minimum wage, gun control and the closure of the Guantanamo Bay prison. The reduced priorities underscore how difficult it has been to get legislation through Congress, the short legislative calendar left this year and Obama's limited political capital.